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Data Protection of RFID-based Distributed Storage
Rakesh Saini
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) has been emerged as one of the most promising
technologies used as an automatic data collection and information storage technology in
vast number of applications. One of the biggest hindrances in the wide adoption of this
technology is the challenge in security. There have been extensive studies on RFID secu-
rity, in particular authentication and privacy issues. In most protocols, the discussions focus
on scenarios that RFID tags are used mainly for tracing or identification, and the access to
data stored on RFID is enforced through authentication. Recently, there is a rise in interests
of using RFID tags as distributed storage, e.g., storing floor plans which can be used by fire
fighters during emergencies. In this new type of applications, quite often, XML (exten-
sible Markup Language) is employed since it has been considered as a de-facto standard
to store and exchange information on the Internet and through other means. This research
proposes to securely and efficiently store data on RFID tags in XML format. We introduce
a framework using cryptography that ensures data confidentiality and integrity; we em-
ploy multi-level encryption together with role-based access control on the data stored on an
RFID tag. In the given framework, a user is assigned with a certain role and can only access
iii
the part of data that she is authorized according to her role and the Access Control Policy
(ACP). In addition, a more profound and accurate definition of simple and complex XACL
(XML Access Control Policies) is given and a workable cryptographic solution is provided
to handle complex policies. Furthermore, two different encryption methods are introduced
to minimize the size of a file encrypted using XML encryption specifications. The research
also extends the current technique of populating PvFID tag memory with BIM (Building
Information Model) database information in Facilities Management System (FMS) appli-
cations, by adding roles and different security levels. To explore the technical feasibility of
the proposed approach, a case study in facilities management with different roles and se-
curity permissions has been implemented and tested at Concordia University. In this case
study, we apply the proposed framework and encryption scheme to provide fine-grained
access to data stored on RFID tags. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first work that
addresses security issues in this new type of RFID-based distributed storage applications.
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In the past decade, there has been a boom in deploying Radio Frequency Identification
(RFID) tags in different fields, e.g., electronic toll collection and contact-less passports [8].
Most protocols proposed so far focus on scenarios that RFID tags are used mainly for the
purpose of identification and tracing. Recently, there rise interests of using RFID tags as
distributed storage [18,27,46,52] so as to retrieve information related to a component, e.g.,
its status instead of only its identification, in real time, due to the benefit of convenient
wireless management. However, such early work concentrates mainly on the basic func-
tionality (e.g., storing and retrieving) of RFID tags, and security issues (e.g., access control
to the data stored on an RFID tag) are largely ignored.
The wide usages of RFID have lead to extensive studies on RFID security, in particular
authentication [9, 19, 38, 59, 61, 75, 76] and privacy [3, 25, 34, 37, 40-42, 62, 67] issues.
In these security solutions, access control to the data stored on an RFID tag is enforced
through authentication. In other words, an entity can retrieve all the information on the tag
if it has already successfully passed the authentication process. In most cases, the tag only
stores very limited information about the product (e.g., a unique product ID), which is not
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sufficient to complete a task. Therefore, we have to refer to a centralized database to obtain
more detailed information about the product to which the RFID tag is attached.
The centralized solution works well in many applications, e.g., books management in
libraries [49] and patient and staff tracking in hospitals [48]. However, the effectiveness of
this solution highly relies on the availability of an online centralized database. Thus, a ma-
jor problem of this solution is the single-point-of-failure. In emergency-response scenarios,
e.g., earthquakes or the outbreak of a fire, the communication with the centralized database
may be totally unavailable. In addition, if an adversary could compromise the centralized
database, all the confidential data stored on this database are disclosed or modified. Recent
research shows that it is possible to compromise the centralized database using an RFID
chip. Typical attacks include buffer overflow, code injection, and SQL injection [63,64].
Moreover, the centralized solution may result in a delay in the completion of certain tasks,
which is not suitable for scenarios that have real-time requirements.
Historically, the choice of the centralized solution is mainly due to the limited memory
size of the first generation RFID tags. Nowadays, the memory size of an RFID tag (in par-
ticular an active tag) is large enough to hold the information on the tag itself. For example,
IDENTEC SOLUTIONS 's Ì-Q32T active UHF tag has a memory size of 32 KBytes [70].
The advance in RFID storage technologies makes it possible to use an RFID tag as a small
local data storage, and thus greatly broadens the industrial usages of RFID tags, e.g., Facil-
ities Management Systems (FMSs) and Indoor Navigation Systems (INSs) [54]. Moreover,
centralized servers offer only a part of the information required to make effective facil-
ity maintenance decisions. They are not capable of providing accurate information about
the state and structure of certain parts of a building throughout its lifecycle because they
may fail to incorporate modifications made and additional data collected after the parts left
the manufacturer, unless other organizations agree to provide this information to the cen-
tral data repository. Moreover, with the global nature of todays supply chains, centralised
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product databases are mostly impractical, since not all information about a single part can
necessarily be kept by one company. In most cases it is practical to distribute the data
among multiple databases [28].
A more detailed motivating example is given in Section 3.1. With sufficient memory
capacity, it is possible to update RFID tag contents throughout the life-cycle as information
about the part is collected or changed. On the other hand, in spite of the increase of the
storage capacity of RFID tags, any method that can improve the cost/storage efficiency
is still highly desirable. In terms of data management, therefore, we allow data used for
different purposes/services to be stored on the same tag to maximize the usage of the RFID
storage.
The choice of data location and storage entirely depends on the application. The fol-
lowing are some of the points which may justify the cause of storing data directly on the
tags:
• Real-time decisions. In certain scenario (e.g., emergency like fire), decisions have
to be made in real time. In this case, it might be inefficient to access necessary
information about the building from a database held elsewhere on the network. Here,
storing data on the tag could be a more efficient method as real-time decisions require
real-time availability of information.
• Real-time data capture. There are many situations where data need to be captured
and recorded in real-time throughout the lifecycle of the building/tag. An example
of such a case is monitoring of temperature variations in different parts of a building.
Here, temperature sensors might be attached to RFID tags and variations/abnormali-
ties could be recorded directly on to the tag itself.
• Data access/update at remote locations. Another reason why data might be kept
on the tag is if data need to be available immediately in a place where access to a
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networked database is not available. For example, wireless signals are not available
in basements.
• Frequent data access. Throughout the lifecycle (e.g., manufacturing, shipping, trans-
portation, operation and inspection) of a building, there are various decisions that
need to be taken, which in turn use different sets of information about the building.
Some information would need to be accessed more frequently than others. In situ-
ations where the frequency of data access is high and the cost of data retrieval and
transmission is greater than the cost of the writable tag, it is advisable to store data
on the tag.
The distributed storage of data on RFID tags can provide many benefits, such as real-
time data access and emergency response. As a trade-off, it also bring certain potential risks
and challenges. Since the actual data are stored on tags instead of a back-end database, a
major concern will be data protection, including both confidentiality and integrity.
Current solutions based on authentication are vulnerable to physical attacks, since RFID
tags are installed at open areas. Although there is little formal research on the effectiveness
of physical attacks against RFIDs, as a type of smart cards, current physical attacks against
smart cards [2,24,83] are also applicable to RFID tags. As a result, data should be encrypted
not only during the communication between an RFID tag and an RFID reader but also when
they are stored on the tag.
In our Facilities Management (FM) and emergency response applications (explained in
chapter 4), different parts of the data may be accessible only by a specific set of users, and
sometimes the data stored on a tag may belong to multiple owners, who do not have full
trusts in each other. Therefore, a naive solution that encrypts all the data with a single key
does not work. A possible solution is to assign each specific set of users (or say role) a
shared key and then encrypt all the data accessible by a role with its corresponding key.
However, this method is workable only when the data accessible by any pair of roles are
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totally disjointed, and is unsuitable for the scenarios in which the data accessible by a pair
of roles are overlapped1 . In the latter, multiple ciphertexts corresponding to the overlapped
data are generated and stored. Apparently, it leads to poor storage efficiency. Moreover,
the extension of generating a specific key for the overlapped data is infeasible due to the
key management issue.
1.2 Research Objectives and Contributions
The objectives of this research are: (1) To review current research on the security of RPID
technology; (2) To probe the idea of providing security on the RFID tags within existing
constrains of limited computation capability; (3) To define simple and complex XML Ac-
cess Control Policy (XACP) and generate an algorithm that determines the exact type of
Access Control Policy (ACP); (4) To investigate cryptographic solution to handle complex
policies; (5) To demonstrate the effect of different encryption modes on storage efficiency;
and (6) To demonstrate the feasibility of the proposed approach through a real world case
study.
To address these challenges, in this thesis, we propose the first framework that pro-
vides efficient data protection in RFID-based Distributed Storage (RDS) applications. Our
contributions are:
• To ensure data confidentiality and integrity, we employ multi-layer encryption to-
gether with role-based access control on the data stored on an RFID tag. In our
scheme, although any user can download the data stored on a tag, the protection of
the data or a certain part of the data relies on the key(s) that is/are assigned to the
user instead of the on-tag authentication mechanism. A user can only access the part
of data that she/he is authorized according to her/his role and the ACP.
1In a special case, the data accessible by one role is contained in the data accessible by another role.
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• Previous definitions of simple XACP and complex XACP are inaccurate. In this
paper, we redefine these two terms in terms of data publishing.
• We design an algorithm that determine the exact type of the ACP, simple or com-
plex. This output can be used as a guidance for the selection of a storage-efficient
encryption method.
• Notice that previous cryptography-based solutions to complex XACP are considered
problematic [10], we propose a solution to this issue.
• We present different XML encryption modes, apart from standard XML encryption
specification, to enhance storage efficiency.
In this thesis, we focus on the case that the data stored on an RFID tag are represented in
XML [77], although the proposed framework and algorithms can be readily extended to
support other types of data representations. In addition, although we focus on the RFID-
based distributed storage applications in this paper, the proposed framework and algorithms
can be used for access control on data publishing in general, in particular when there is a
concern about the storage efficiency.
1.3 Thesis Organization
The thesis is organized as follows:
Chapter 2 Literature Review. This chapter reviews the major technologies and stan-
dards that are used in the research. Literature review comprises the history of RFID tech-
nology, its components and details about RFID applications and previous security solu-
tions. Facilities Management Systems and Indoor Navigation Systems are briefly covered
in this chapter. This chapter also provides introduction to XML technology and some of
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its features such as, XML Access control and XML Encryption. Moreover, XML research
problem evolving around access control policies and previous solutions are discussed.
Chapter 3 Proposed System Model and Framework: In this chapter, the proposed secu-
rity framework for securing data stored on RFID tags using XML super encryption and role
based XML access control is elaborated. This chapter includes conceptual and interaction
design of the system. All the steps involved in encryption and decryption are explained
explicitly. This chapter also goes through the procedure of key generation for a role and
gives a brief introduction to multi-layer encryption. In order to elaborate more on the appli-
cability of the introduced approach, experimental results are provided that give the impact
of different XML encryption modes on storage efficiency.
Chapter 4 Case Study: In this chapter, the proposed approach is demonstrated by means
of a case study. In the case study, the approach is used to facilitate a secure communication
protocol for a facilities management and emergency response system. Conceptual and
software design along with a prototype software are explained.
Chapter 5 Conclusions and Future Work: This chapter summarizes the present research




2.1 Radio Frequency Identification
RFID, is a broad term that contains several information and communication technolo-
gies that use radio communication to uniquely identify objects [6,31] by storing a certain
amount of data such as the product identification, price or manufacturing date in RFID
tag's memory. Unique identification with RFID becomes explicit: the object, location or
individual is assigned a unique identifier code contained within an RFID tag, which is in
some way attached to or embedded in the target. An RFID reader is used to search for tags,
when a reader receives a signal that a tag is present in its vicinity, it retrieves data from tag
wirelessly providing the ability to process large amount of multiple data set simultaneously
for a particular application.
2.1.1 RFID Architecture and Components
The typical RFID system consists of a reader (also called beacon), tags (also called transpon-
der or chip), antenna and backend server that receives and processes the information that
the reader collects from the tags. The emission of radio signals by the reader's antenna
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activates a tag to read or write data from/to it. The reader is responsible for transmitting
adequate energy to power up and communicate with the tag to request and receive the
data. The range of reader's radio waves depends on its power and radio frequency and can
activate tags at a distance up to 100 feet or more. When RFID tags come under the electro-
magnetic zone generated by reader's antenna, they detect the activation signal and respond
by sending stored data in the form of electromagnetic waves. The reader then decodes the
received data which is encoded in the integrated circuit of the tag and passes them to the
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Figure 2.1: Conventional RFID System
Tag
RFID tag is a microchip joined with antenna in a compact package. It comes under the cat-
egory of transponders, which is a combination of transmitter and receiver and is designed to
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receive a specific radio signal and automatically transmit a reply. A tag can send from sim-
ple reply signal to single digit or multiple set of strings of letters. In the near future, RFID
tags may be able to do complex calculations like encryption and decryption. In general,
RFID tag contains encoding/decoding circuitry, power supply, antenna, communication
control and memory [74].
Tags can be further classified into three categories: passive, semi-passive and active.
• Passive: The tags that do not carry battery or any other power source and depend
entirely on the reader for their power fall in this category. These tags contain a
resonant circuit capable of absorbing power from reader's antenna [74]. To get data
from passive tags, the reader's antenna should be in close vicinity of the tag and
with higher power as compare to active tags. Passive tags are much lighter and
less expensive than active tags, and virtually offer unlimited operational lifetime.
Figure 2.2 shows high level view of reader and passive tag communication.
• Semi-Active: Unlike passive tags, semi-active tags have battery of their own to pro-
vide power to the memory chip for on-tag calculations only. Semi-active tags have
bigger memory size than passive tags. Though semi-active tags have battery, still
they rely on power from reader to start communication.
• Active: The tags have their own power source, used for both on-tag calculation and
communication with reader. As these tags do not depend on reader's power, they
are able to transmit and receive electromagnetic radio signals over a long range of
distance and support more reliable communication. Further, active tags can operate
very well in challenging environments like places with significant radio frequency
pollution caused by electric machinery. It is easy to extend active tags with additional
sensing capability, like temperature sensors [65,70]. Active tags are usually bigger
and more expensive than passive and semi-active ones and have a limited operational
10
life which may yield a maximum of 10 years, depending on operating temperature




1) Reader sends power to tag
2) Reader sends operation command to tag
3) Tag respond to reader's command by using
reader power
Figure 2.2: High-Level View of Reader and Passive Tag Communication [65]
Reader
The reader retrieves the information from the RFID tag. The reader may be self-contained
and record the information internally, or it may also be a part of a Local/Wide Area Net-
work (LAVAN). Readers send data to a LAN or other systems by using a data interface such
as Ethernet or serial RS-232. Other parts that a reader typically contains are a system inter-
face such as an RS-232 serial port or Ethernet jack, cryptographic encoding and decoding
circuitry, a power supply or battery, and communications control circuits. Readers can be
of different sizes from postage stamp-sized to large devices with panels that are several feet




















Figure 2.3: (a) Data Exchange Occurs at Close Distance Between Antenna and Passive Tag
(b) Data Exchange Occurs at Longer Distance Between Antenna and Active Tag [74]
Antenna
The antenna can be an integral part of the reader, or it can be a separate device. Handheld
units are a combination reader/antenna, while larger systems usually separate the antennas
from the reader.
Middleware
Middleware is a very important component in conventional RFID systems. It manages the
readers and data transmitted from the tags, and then passes to the backend server. Mid-
dleware is a software runs on ordinary computers or servers, which contains the logic of
the RFID application, and a backend database system for storing information about the
tags. Middleware is placed in between the reader and the backend, and manages the flow
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of information. It also performs functions such as basic filtering and reader integration and
control. With the passage of time, the middleware is supposed to improve its features and
expand management capabilities and extend data management options [74]. Middleware
is prone to many security attacks like Man in the Middle attack. The backend can be any
standard database server such as Oracle, SQL, etc. and suffers from conventional database
security threats.
2.1.2 Brief History of RFID Technology
RFID is a combination of radar and radio broadcast technology. The starting of RFID
technology can be traced back to development carried out on radar technology during World
War II. Identify Friend or Foe system (IFF), first introduced in WWII is considered as
the initial phase of today's RFID. IFF systems were further developed in the 1950s and
nowadays are in common use in civil and military aviation [13,65].
Harry Stockman, published a paper entitled "Communication by Means of Reflected
Power" [73]. In the late 1960s, two companies called Sensormatic and Checkpoint together
with another company called Knogo, developed the Electronic Article Surveillance (EAS)
tags. These are 1 bit tags that are attached to items in order to prevent and detect the theft
of merchandise, EAS tags are very cheap and are still in use today [45].
Commercialization of RFID was not started until the 1970s. In the early 1970s, RFID
was used for access control, following Charles Walton's patent of a tag used to unlock
a door without a key [36]. During the same period, large companies such as Raytheon
and RCA developed electronic identification systems. The Los Alamos Scientific Labo-
ratory, the International Bridge Turnpike and Tunnel Association (IBTTA) and the United
States Federal Highway Administration organized a conference on RFID in 1973 which
concluded that there was no national interest in the development of a standard for vehicle
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identification [14]. This decision lead to the development of a range of RFID related sys-
tems. In 1978, RJ. King wrote a book about microwave homodyne techniques. This book
has been used as the basis for the development of the theory and practice which are used in
backscatter RFID systems [45].
In the beginning of 1980s, RFID found applications in cattle tagging and railroad freight
tracking. At the end of the 1980s, with the rapid miniaturization of electronics, which of-
fered at the same time lower cost and higher performance and capacity, RFID technology
became commonplace and found a variety of applications. One particular area of ma-
jor growth has been the use of passive inductive tags to develop a variety of contact-less
smart cards which have found popular applications, especially in access control and ticket-
ing [65].
During 1990s, a number of American states, such as Kansas and Georgia, adopted a
traffic management system which was based on the use of readers that could detect RFID
tags. Europe also followed the American foot steps in traffic management. Texas In-
struments developed the TIRIS system which was used in applications related to vehicle
access. European companies, such as Alcatel, Bosch and Phillips spin-off companies, such
as Combitech, Tagmaster and Baumer were involved in the development of a pan-European
standard for tolling applications. These companies helped develop a common standard for
electronic tolling.
At the beginning of the 2000s, RFID came into prominence due to its unique capability
to automatically identify tagged entities at potentially very low cost. At the same time, the
internet has been established as the primary infrastructure for the operational deployment
of network services that could complement well the advantages of RFID. In 2004, EPC-
Global [15] released the second generation standard for Electronic Product Code (EPC)




RFID is a versatile technology, capable of being used in vast number of fields. Huge
success of RFID in supply chains and replacement of barcodes, have overshadowed how
extensively and successfully RFID is used in other contexts. RFID has been identified
as one of the ten greatest contributory technologies of the 21st century. This technology
has found a rapidly growing market; in 2008 the RFID market approached US$ 4 billion,
growing approximately 35% from 2007. RFID market is estimated to exceed US$ 4.4
billion in 2009 an 11% growth rate over 2008 [60]. An increasing variety of enterprises
are employing RFID to improve their efficiency of operations and to gain a competitive
advantage [7]. The following are the some of the RFID uses [74]: supply chains (including
wholesale and retail inventory and materials management), item-level tagging of consumer
goods on retail shelves, toll payment systems, smart cards, contact-less payment systems,
asset tracking, automobile keyless start systems, sports, ticketing, access control, luggage
tracking, passports and border control, libraries and building management. Apart from the
above mentioned applications, RFID has a great potential in FMS and emerged as a strong
contender for INS.
Facilities Management Systems (FMSs)
The Construction Industry Institute [44] pointed out a number of potential application ar-
eas for RFID technology in the sector. These included component tracking and locating,
inventory management, equipment monitoring, progress management, facilities and main-
tenance management, tool tracking, material management and quality control [17,43,71].
However, the cost of implementing RFID solutions has remained high as each of the above-
mentioned applications is designed for only one specific stage of the facility lifecycle to
serve the needs of only one of the stakeholders in a fragmented fashion, i.e., Architects,
Engineers, Constructors, Owners and Operators (AECOO). Further, using different tags at
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different stages eliminates the chance of using shared resources among the stakeholders
causing duplication of efforts and resources.
The AECOO industry is highly fragmented in nature. Thus, it involves bringing to-
gether multi-disciplines and different parties in a project that requires a tremendous amount
of coordination. There is an evident need for a standard information transfer model between
different software applications used in the AECOO industry. The Building Information
Model (BIM) has been developed in order to tackle the problems related to interoperability
and information integration by providing effective management, sharing and exchange of a
building information through its entire lifecycle [35].
According to [26], BIM is a data-rich, object oriented, intelligent and parametric digital
representation of facilities. [58] described the scope of BIM within the following relation-
ships: (1) BIM as a product or intelligent digital representation of data about a capital
facility, (2) BIM as a collaborative process which covers business drivers, automated pro-
cess capabilities, and open information standards use for information sustainability and
fidelity, and (3) BIM as a facility lifecycle management tool of well understood informa-
tion exchanges, workflows, and procedures which stakeholders use throughout the building
lifecycle as a repeatable, verifiable, transparent, and sustainable information based envi-
ronment. BIM acts as an enabler of interoperability and is a facilitator of data sharing and
exchange between software applications. Furthermore, BIM is extensible, open and vendor
neutral [35]. Figures 2.4 and 2.5 conceptually show how BIM data chunks are stored on
tags attached to the building components. While the information is centrally stored in the
BIM database, software applications copy the necessary information from the database to







Figure 2.4: Conceptual System Interaction Design [54]
Indoor Navigation Systems (INSs)
In the last few years many systems have addressed the problem of automatic positioning.
Triangulation, scene analysis, and proximity are the three principal techniques for auto-
matic location-sensing [32]. The most common example is Global Positioning System
(GPS) [33], as it is satellite dependent, it is not able to accurately identify the position of
objects or people inside building.
Based on the idea of GPS a much varied set of alternative INSs have been developed
over the years, based in technologies such as infrared [82], ultrasonic/sonic signals [29], ar-
tificial vision and now with RFID [4,30]. While, position-sensing was not the primary task
of RFID, recent studies showed that no-contact, non-line-of-site nature, long transmission-
range and low cost are some of the advantages of RFID over other technologies. Indoor lo-
calization technology is becoming more sophisticated and affordable day by day. Many in-
door location-aware applications such as emergency management in hospitals [48], airport





Figure 2.5: Conceptual BIM-Tag Data Relationship [54]
etc., require knowledge of position of mobile objects or persons for their operation.
There have been many positioning systems based on two prototypes. In the first pro-
totype, RFID readers are placed at certain fixed locations. Each reader defines a certain
range in which it can detect RFID tags because of pre-determined power level. The whole
region is further divided into sub-regions by placing the readers at known positions. Each
sub-region can be uniquely identified by the subset of readers that cover that sub-region.
An RFID tag is associated with that known sub-region, which detects it, based on the sub-
set of readers. The accuracy of this approach is then determined by the number of readers
required, placement of readers and the power level of each reader. There has been many
variations is in this prototype to improve its efficiency such as [57, 68].
Another prototype is just opposite of previous one, where tags are fixed to the building's
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infrastructure and the reader is the mobile agent, whose relative position needs to be esti-
mated. The location information stored on the tags helps estimate the approximate position
of the RFID reader relative to the positions of the tags detected in is immediate vicinity.
Deployment information assessable from the tags permits estimation of the reader position
with respect to the map where they belong. This application is of significant importance
during emergency situations, where an agent requires real-time localization and possible
path planning towards a certain destination (e.g. an exit during a fire) [22].
Above mentioned prototypes have one common limitation. The approximate position
calculated is always with respect to some part of a map where the tag or reader is placed,
but the map itself may not be available at runtime. The User should have the associated
map or floor plan of the building in his hand held device before using this positioning
system. Also, due to limited memory it is not possible to store whole floor plan on RFID
tags. The problem becomes further difficult as every building has a set of floor plans and
storing all these plans at one place would not be very cost efficient. To make the proper use
of increasing active RFID tag memory, we propose to divide a floor plan into small sections
and store them on different tags. This information helps the navigator to build the whole
floor plan as he/she moves along without any prior knowledge of building map.
2.1.4 RFID Security Vulnerabilities
Due to large number of advantages over other technologies, RFID is becoming more pop-
ular and expected to replace current technologies, such as barcodes. However, privacy
protection, authentication issues and other security vulnerabilities which make it an easy
target for malicious attacks, lead to growing concern among RFID users and vendors. At-
tack on RFID can be on the entire system, or it can be on any part of the overall system.
This section discusses various attacks that can occur on RFID systems and applications and
previous research work to tackle these attacks.
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Attack on Radio Frequency
Spoofing attack provides false information that appears valid and accepted by the system.
Broadcasting an incorrect EPC number over the air when a valid number was expected is
an example of spoofing in RFID system.
Replay attack, a valid RFID signal is intercepted and its data is recorded; these data are
later transmitted to a reader where they are played back.
Denial of Service (DoS) attacks, also known as flood attacks, take place when a signal
is flooded with more data than it can handle. A variation on this is RF jamming.
Attack on Tag Data
Certain programs like RF Dump scans for RFID tags via reader attached to the serial port
of a computer. When the reader recognizes a card, the program presents the card data in a
spreadsheet-like format on the screen. The user can then enter or change data and reflect
those changes on the tag. RF Dump also makes sure that the data written is the correct
length for the tag's fields, by either padding zeros or truncating extra digits as needed. A
Personal Digital Assistant (PDA) program called RF Dump-PDA is available for use on
PDAs such as the Hewlett-Packard iPAQ Pocket PC. RF Dump-PDA is written in Perl,
and will run on Pocket PCs running the Linux operating system. Using a PDA and RF
Dump-PDA, a thief can walk through a store and change the data on items [74].
Attack on Backend Server
The Database is a very crucial part of the RFID system. It may hold valuable informa-
tion like trade secret or customer's credit card number, manipulation or theft of which can
lead to dire consequences, especially, in applications such as hospital's inventory, where
a change of one letter involving a patient's blood type could put patient's life at risk and
building management system where replacing the material used in construction could result
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in building collapse.
Structured Query Language (SQL) injection and buffer overflow attacks, are fairly new
ideas. RFID interface can be used to insert information into the database, unless proper
checking systems are used to guarantee that only legitimate tags are trusted. Recently a
group in Netherlands created RFID viruses and worms that fit a malicious program (mal-
ware) onto the memory area of a programmable RFID chip (i.e., a tag). When the chip
was queried by the reader, the malware passed from the chip to the backend database,
from where the malware could be passed to other tags or used to carry out malevolent ac-
tions. The exploits employed, including SQL and buffer overflow attacks, are generally
used against servers [74]. Other drawback of backend server is a potential single point of
failure, so it needs to be redundant, distributed and secure.
2.1.5 Previous Solutions
In the majority of the applications mentioned above, passive tags are used mainly because
of their less cost and virtually endless life. The two main security concerns of passive
tags in their current format are privacy and authentication. Privacy is further categorized
into two problems of clandestine tracking and inventorying [39]. As RFID tags respond to
any compatible reader without distinction, the matter of a nearby RFID reader being able
to scan any RFID tag is dig into by clandestine tracking. On the other hand clandestine
inventorying is about getting sensitive information from the tags. Authentication is another
big security concern, it can be done in two ways. By authenticating a reader to a tag, and
by authenticating a tag to a reader. Extensive research in RFID security has been carried
out in both privacy and authentication.
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Privacy Solutions
The simplest method to protect privacy is by preventing RFID tags from communicating
by enclosing them in Faraday cage [39] such as a metallic sheet.
The Blocker Tag [40] was designed to block selectively by simulating only selected
subsets of ID codes, such as those by a particular manufacturer, or those in a designated
privacy zone. The Blocker Tag can be bypassed easily if a reader does not follow the
singulation protocol.
EPCglobal chip designs address the privacy problem by allowing an RFID tag to be
killed [16]. Additional processing capability is required in the tag to protect the password
against the unauthorized use that eventually kills the tag.
In Clipped tags [42], consumers can physically separate the body (chip) from the head
(antenna) in an intuitive way. Such a separation provides visual confirmation the tag has
been deactivated. However, a physical contact channel may be used later to reactivate it.
Such a reactivation would require deliberate actions on the part of the owner of the RFID
tag to permit the reactivation to take place.
RFID Enhancer Proxy (REP) [41] assumes the identities of tags and simulates them in
the presence of reading devices by continuously relabeling their IDs. The REP suffers from
a number of shortcomings such as corruption of tag data, tag-to-REP de-synchronization
and difficulty in tag release that are attributed to the fact that tag identities need to be
partially generated by the tag and match portions of its true ID. Some of other works
like [25,34] also deals with privacy issues.
Hash-Locking [84], is a method that uses one-way hash function to generate a metaID
that obscures the tag's original ID while providing an index to find the tag's ID in the
database. Since there is no dynamic mechanism to randomize the metaID, it acts as an




The RFID Guardian [62] looks for, records, and displays all RFID tags and scans in the
vicinity, manages RFID keys, authenticates nearby RFID readers, and blocks attempted
accesses to the user's RFID tags from unauthorized readers. RFID Guardian acts as an in-
termediary between tags and readers and must always be active in protecting tag responses
from unauthorized read attempts. It has to either allow reader queries, appropriately re-
issuing queries in encrypted form, or actively block tag answers. Thus if the Guardian
fails, security is lost. Furthermore, it does not deal with such issues as tag acquisition and
ownership transfer.
Other authentication protocols such as [19,37,38,41,42,59,62,75,76] mainly rely
on encryption, nonce or challenge-response. All these solutions require tag to do some
kind of computation like random number generation and encryption/decryption. Nonce
is used to ensure the communication is fresh and cryptography is needed to secure the
communication. These solutions to authentication problems are beyond the current state
of the art of RFID because present tags lack the computing capability to do even simple
cryptographic calculation. The cryptographic capabilities necessary for vigorous security
will require an increase of orders of magnitude in circuit complexity. In most protocols, the
discussions focus on scenarios that RFID tags are used mainly for tracing or identification,
and the access control of data stored on RFID is enforced through authentication.
Unfortunately, such mechanisms are unsuitable for the new type of applications like
indoor navigation and facilities management, in which the actual data are stored and dis-
tributed on the RFID tags instead of a back-end database. To the best of our knowledge,
this research is the first work that investigates security issues, in particular access control,
in this new type of applications.
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2.2 extensible Markup Language (XML)
The extensible Markup Language (XML) [77], recommended by World Wide Web Con-
sortium (W3C) is a standard to describe, store and exchange information on the Internet
and through other means. XML is a restricted subset of Standard Generalized Markup Lan-
guage (SGML). XML is similar to Hypertext Markup Language (HTML). Both XML and
HTML consist of markup symbols to illustrate the contents of a page or file. The XML
specification defines a syntax for creating markup. Elements, attributes and other struc-
tures that are used to label documents and data in a manner that makes sense to computer
programs and even humans are part of markup. XML gives power to users to define their
own tags which makes XML self-descriptive. XML contains self-defined data in document
format; so as syntax it is platform independent. Some of the key features of XML are flex-
ibility, open standard, enhanced scalability and compression. Also, the order in which data
appears is not important in XML. In short, XML is designed for sharing information easily
via a non-proprietary format over different channels. Figure 2.6 shows a sample XML file
with custom-defined tags for product inspection in a FMS.
2.2.1 XML Encryption
XML encryption [79] is a W3C standard for encrypting XML documents. It defines a
course of action of encrypting and decrypting digital XML contents, using specific syntax
and algorithms. The basic concept of cryptography remains mostly the same, the differ-
ence comes in representing and exchanging encrypted XML contents. XML encryption
specification includes the standard syntax for representing the encrypted contents within
XML, along with information needed to decrypt the contents on the receiving side. The
encryption method consists of taking an element from an XML document, encrypting it
and all its children and then replacing the original XML content with encrypted XML such
that the newly generated document remains well formed. There are three ways of XML
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<?xml version="1.0" standalone="no"?>



















Figure 2.6: XML Example File for Product Inspection in Facilities Management System
encryption [69]:
• Using symmetric encryption only: Only one session key is used to encrypt and de-
crypt. The key itself is not stored with the encrypted document.
• Using combination of asymmetric and symmetric: In this method a session key is
used to encrypt the data and an asymmetric key to protect the session key. Both,
encrypted session key and data are stored together in XML document. The public
asymmetric key is used to encrypt the session key while the private asymmetric key
is used to decrypt the key.
• Using X.509 certificate: This approach uses X.509 certificate as the symmetrical key.
X.509 certificate are provided by a third party vendor.
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After encryption either the whole element is replaced with an element named En-
cryptedData or just the data in the element is replaced and its name remains readable in
the encrypted document. As shown in Figure 2.6, Inspection element contains child ele-
ment called Hazard-Material which may contain some confidential information regarding
chemicals stored or used in a room. If data owner does not want every user to know about
this information, it would be more appropriate to replace the whole element. Usually it de-
pends on what the data is and how much information is necessary to give away. Figure 2.7
shows XML document from Figure 2.6 encrypted with a public key of recipient using
asymmetric approach where Hazard-Material element and its child elements are replaced
with EncryptedData
Super-Encryption
An XML document may contain zero or more EncryptedData elements. EncryptedData
cannot be the parent or child of another EncryptedData element. However, the actual data
encrypted can be anything, including EncryptedData and EncryptedKey elements (i.e.,
super-encryption). During super-encryption of an EncryptedData or EncryptedKey ele-
ment, the entire element must be encrypted. Encrypting only the content of these elements,
or encrypting selected child elements is an invalid instance under the provided schema [79].
For example, consider Figure 2.8.
A valid super-encryption of EncryptedData[Id='EDl'] in Figure 2.8 is shown in Fig-
ure 2.9, where the CipherValue content of 'newEncryptedData' is the base64 encoding of







































Figure 2.7: Encrypted XML File Using Asymmetric Approach
2.2.2 XML Access Control
In the past few years, XML expanded its sphere from being a standard for web document
to become broadly popular as a data encoding format. Whereas conventional methods
employed server-side techniques such as security views and query re-writing, there have
been some doubts on the scalability of these approaches to manage applications involving
large number of users and complex ACP. Another technique called secure publishing has
been explored, in which the owner of the data source publishes data for public user usually
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<?xml version="1.0" standalone="no"?>
















Figure 2.8: Encrypted XML File Using Symmetric Approach
on insecure channels. In general, the data owner may have some sensitive information that
should be available to selected users only.
The need of distribution and sharing of information leads to the importance of precise
and secure access of XML data. Certain users are allowed to access specific parts of in-
formation stored in an XML document while preserving confidentiality of the rest of the
document. Hence, access control over XML data is required to ensure that only authorized
users have access to the parts of the data they are allowed to. Otherwise, authorized users
have no access to any part of the document. The ACP defines how the document appears
for different users. ACP provides XML with a fine-grained access control mechanism that
enables the user to securely browse XML documents. ACP is used to specify an object-
subject relation in the context of a particular XML document. Where, subject is a user or
role and object is as fine as single element or a set of elements within the document.
The required access control is enforced by encrypting regions of the XML document
using cryptographic keys. All authorized users get the set of keys corresponding to the
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<?xml version="1.0" standalone="no"?>












Figure 2.9: Super Encryption : XML File Encrypted Twice Using Symmetric Approach
assigned permissions under the ACP. An ACP enforces them to decrypt only parts of the
document consisting of element nodes they have been granted access to.
XPath [78] or XQurery [81] is used to extract different parts of the XML document
as defined in ACP. An ACP can be defined as a sequence of XPath filter [80] expressions,
which are combined using operation set intersection, subtraction and union. The set of
nodes which must be hidden from a particular user are represented by the set Subtract. For
example, consider Figure 2.6 and let an ACP states that a user is denied access to XML tag
Hazard-Material and all its children. The given policy can be specified as:





<dsig-xpath : XPath> }
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Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) [20] approach has been proposed in recent XML
access control solutions [10, 85]. RBAC has become preferred choice of defining and im-
plementing access control since its introduction in 1995. The idea of RBAC is very simple,
different roles exist in the system and permissions are assigned to roles instead of indi-
vidual users, it then manage access to information with respect to these roles. To access
information, a user must be a member of a predefined role and inherits the authorization
privileges of that role.
2.2.3 Limitations of XML RBAC
One naive way to implement ACP is using super-encryption, in which every single node is
encrypted with a unique key but this leads to drastic increase in size of a document many
folds. Furthermore, this implementation may end up assigning many keys.
A research topic that is tightly relevant to our work is secure data publishing of XML
documents over the Internet. Many XML access control models have been proposed so
far [5, 10, 12, 51, 55]. There are two major barriers of directly applying these solutions
to the RFID-based distributed storage applications. One is the limitation on the storage.
For example, the work done by Miklau and Suciu [51] generates many meta-nodes which
increases the size of original document. Another weakness of this work is that users may
have to maintain multiple keys. The other barrier is the absence of an online trusted server
that enforces the XACR In addition, previous cryptographic-based solution [10] focuses
on scenarios with simple XACPs, and there is a lack of detailed discussions and feasible
solutions, given that there is no online trusted server, for scenarios with complex XACPs.
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2.3 Summary
In this chapter various technologies, standards and applications related to RFID and XML
were reviewed. The literature showed that RFID technology has the potential to facilitate
several distributed storage applications. The current security solutions available are not
capable of providing confidentially and integrity on the data stored on RFID tags in these
applications. On the other hand, XML is emerging as preferred data format for storing
information on RFID tags. RFID and XML can work together as complimentary technolo-
gies. The idea is central to our proposed approach and is introduced in this research as
a new opportunity for providing RBAC with multi-layer encryption of the data stored in
RFID tags, without any cryptographic computations on the tag. Our proposed approach is
based on this thorough review of related technologies and standards.
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Chapter 3
Proposed System Model and Framework
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we motivate our design by presenting a scenario that RFID tags are em-
ployed as distributed storages. The following example is based on an on-going project at
Concordia University that aims at providing real-time services to facilities managers and
fire fighters. These two roles will be used as examples of roles used in RBAC in Section 4.1
During fire emergencies, it is critical for fire fighters to accurately identify their po-
sitions in the building in real-time and obtain detailed and up-to-date information about
the circumstances. The availability of such information directly affects the correctness of
the decision that fire fighters make and the effectiveness of operations that they undertake.
Currently, upon arrival in the fire site, the fire fighter are given a set of floor plans of the
building, including special symbols about the location of chemical, hazard material, etc.
There are a several problems in this solution. First, a fire fighter has to identify the position
of the floor plan, move to that place, and then find the fire source. However, it may not
be easy to complete all these tasks efficiently during a fire emergency due to time pres-
sure. Besides, these floor plans may include certain confidential information (e.g., hazard
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materials) which adds additional security concerns with handling these documents. An al-
ternative solution is to maintain the floor plans of all the buildings in the city at the fire
station. Hence, whenever the fire station receives a fire alarm from a specific building, the
corresponding floor plan is loaded to fire fighters' portable devices (e.g., a PDA) before
departure. This solution does not provide real-time positioning within a building. Another
issue is the overhead of keeping all the floor plans maintained at the fire station up-to-date.
Most of the information about the building that would be useful to fire fighters would also
be useful to facilities mangers except some sensitive information such as hazard materials
that would be useful only to specific inspectors for health and safety department.
To address the weaknesses of current solutions, we use RFID tags as the media storing
the floor plans and other information. Because of the convenience of wireless communica-
tions, a fire fighter or facility manager can readily download the necessary information and
display it on the portable device when the tag is within a certain range. Figure 3.1 shows
a sample structure of a Building Management (BM) document written in XML. Through
accessing information stored under certain tags, e.g., {Map) and {Hazard - Material),
a floor plan can be generated. There has been research work and ongoing activities in stan-
dardizing the representation of floor plans in a specific format, e.g., XML [72]. To make
navigation possible within the building, CAD floor plans are needed on mobile devices to
display the location of user and to generate path to other positions within the building. This
information should be in appropriate format in order to calculate routes and data analysis.
Floor plans in an image format such as JPEG or GIF do not work adequately. Standard-
ized data formats are preferred, but several requirements are not yet fully supported by
available standards [66]. Detailed discussions about this issue is out of the scope of this
thesis. Moreover, upon receiving the signals from multiple tags, the fire fighter can identify
his/her current position and the path to point of interest. A brief introduction about INS
was discussed in Section 2.1.3.
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We notice that there is still a problem remained in the above solution, i.e., providing part
of the data on the RFID tags to a certain group of users (e.g., fire fighters, facility managers,
Health and Safety (H&S) inspector or regular user of the building) while at the same time
preserving the confidentiality of certain private information that would be available only to







































Figure 3.1: XML Document about Building Management
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3.2 System Design
XML has emerged as the de-facto standard for storing and exchanging information in vast
number of applications, including the new type of applications that use RFID tags as dis-
tributed storage [27,46]. In this thesis, we focus on RFID-based data stored in the XML
format. However, the same framework and data encryption scheme can be readily applied
to other data formats that support hierarchical representation. Moreover, we assume that
the structure of the XML document and the corresponding XACP are changed infrequently.
Further, we assume that the XACP is defined in terms of RBAC [20].
We assume that there exists a trusted data provider, who is responsible for providing
various services using RFID-based distributed storage, such as:
• Defining ACP: This step includes defining permissions for users to access various
parts of data stored on an RFID tag for different operations.
• Managing Roles: This service defines roles and associates users with roles. Example
of different roles along with there access permissions is shown in Table 3.1 .
• Data Management: This process develops data architectures, practices and proce-
dures dealing with data and then executing these aspects on a regular basis. The
type, amount and order of information to be stored on the RFID tag is also defined in
this process.
• Organizing RFID tag: As per the requirement of our application, we use different
types of tags with varying memory sizes. The type of tag, its usage and corresponding
location within the building is decided in this process. For example, in Figure 3.2
active tags with large memory are located at the entry points of the floor; one active
tag with small memory is assigned per room to store required information about the
room and its user; and passive tags are attached at doors to assist in tracking.
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Table 3.1: Examp es of Different Roles and access permissions
Role Name Description of access permissions
Fire Fighter Access to all floor plans, building information and sensitive
information like chemicals in various laboratories
General User of the Building Access to general floor plans only
FM Inspector Access to general floor plans and building specific information
As the main focus of this research is on securing the RFID data, we assume that an
XACP has been defined to control the access to different parts of data stored on the RFID
tags. Thus, the goal of our work is to derive a data protection scheme that can strictly
enforce this XACP and at the same time minimize the storage.
We assume that an adversary can be an outsider or a user who is assigned with one or a
specific set of roles according to the XACP. We also assume that the adversary has certain
capabilities of launching a physical attack [2, 24, 83] so as to obtain the content stored on
an RFID tag, even if the tag is protected by an authentication scheme.
We assume the existence ofa semi-trusted server, which will execute assignedfunction-
alities honestly, but it is not trusted to access confidential data stored on RFID tags. The
main responsibility of this server is key management, the server stores public information
associated with keys. Key generation is discussed in Subsection 3.3.4
3.2.1 Overview of the Proposed Framework
Figure 3.3 shows the proposed framework for protecting RFID-based distributed data. The
framework can be divided into three parts: First part takes care of all the processes required
before storing data on the RFID tags, such as generating a set of role keys based on the
structure of the XML document to be protected and the corresponding XACP, and then ap-
plying multi-layer encryption with these keys. Second part is about releasing the encrypted
XML document on RFlD tags, which can be downloaded by any RFID reader. Third part of
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Figure 3.2: Floor Plan Example Using Different Types of RFID Tags
reader can only partially decrypt the encrypted document with regard to the roles that have
been assigned to him/her. In case of complex policies, the structure of the original XML
document changes. Complex policies and structure changes are discussed in more detail
in Sections 3.3.2 and 3.3.3, respectively. The re-generation of original structure of XML
document is also covered in the framework.
The core design of this framework lies in the tasks performed by the data provider. Once
it is completed, the tasks of releasing, downloading and decrypting are straightforward
in simple policies. The decryption requires some computation on the client side in case
of complex policies. Thus, in the following sections, we focus our discussion on data
encryption and decryption.
37






















Figure 3.3: XML Protection Framework
3.3 Data Encryption Procedure
As shown in Figure 3.4, the procedure of data encryption consists of the following steps:
access tree generation, policy type checking, access tree transformation, key generation,
and XML encryption. Among them, the access tree transformation step is applied only
when the XACP is identified as a complex XACP through the policy type checking step.
3.3.1 Access Tree Generation
The inputs of this step include the original XML document, which is expected to be pro-
tected while providing services to the authorized users, and the corresponding XACP. One

















Figure 3.4: Process of XML Encryption
so as to reduce the complexity of the following task that determines the XACP type. An-
other reason is to reduce the number of encryptions so as to improve the storage efficiency.
The basic idea is to compress a connected part of the original XML tree structure that are
accessible by the same set of roles into a single node. The output is called an Access Tree.
Due to its hierarchical nature, an XML document can be represented as non-cyclic
directed tree T = (N, B) where N is the set of all the nodes N = {??, . . . , nn} in T
and B is the set of all the branches B = {61, ... , bm} inT. In our context, the XACP is
represented with a set of subject-object relations, where a subject is a role and an object is
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a set of elements within the XML document that are accessible by this role. In the context
of T = (N, B), we define the following notations:
• Prnt(rii, T) is defined as the parent node of n¿ in T.
• Chld(rii,T) is defined as the set of all the children nodes of n¿ in T.
• Tni is defined as a subtree of T, the root node of which is n¿.
• nroot denotes the root node of T.
For simplicity we will use Prnt(rii) and Chld(ni) for node n¿ in T, instead of Prnt(ni, T)
and Chld(rii,T), in the remaining part of this thesis.
Let R = [R1, . . . , Rr) denote the set of all the roles defined in the XACP. Let [Ri, iVj
denote a subject-object relation, where Ri is a specific role in R and Ni = [n\, . . . , nf} is
the set of nodes in T that are accessible by users assigned with role i?¿.
Taking T as the input, Algorithm 1 is executed to mark each node of T (denoted as n¿)
with a set containing the roles that can access this node, which is called as the Role Set of
node rii and is denoted as M(nì).
Algorithm 1 Role Marking
Require: The tree representation of an XML document T = (N, B), the XACP of T that
is represented with a set of [Ri, Ni) pairs.
Ensure: The XML document T, each node of which has been marked with roles that can
access it.
1: for all n¿ in N such that 1 < i < ? do
Initialize M(ni) as a empty set.
end for
for all Ri in R such that 1 < i < r do




After all the nodes are marked, Algorithm 2 is performed from the root of T, i.e.,
ATG(T, nroot). At each step of the search, the marking set of the current node 7i¿, i.e., M¿,
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is compared to that of the next node rij, i.e., Mj. If M¿ = Mj, the branch between n¿ and
rij is removed, and ra¿ is merged into n¿. At the end of this depth-first-search, the access
tree corresponding to T is generated.
Algorithm 2 Access Tree Generation ATG(T, nG)
Require: The tree representation of a XML document T = (N, B) in which each node is
marked with the set of accessible roles
Ensure: The access tree TA corresponding to T
1: for all n, in ChId(Uc) do
2: if M(Ui) = M(nG) then
3: for all rij in Chld(rii) do
4: Prnt(rij) <— nG
5: Add rij to ChId(Uc)
6: end for
7: else
8: Call ATG(T, m)
9: end if
10: end for
For example, the tree structure of an XML document D is shown in Figure 3.5. Given
that, there are four roles involved in the XACP of D, denoted as Ri, R2, R3, and R4. The
detailed access information about each role is shown in Table 3.2.
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Figure 3.5: Tree Structure of XML Document
3.3.2 Policy Type Checking
Previous work on XML access control [10,51] focus on scenarios where data access can
be defined with a simple XACP. As to complex XACPs, which happen frequently in real-
world applications, Crampton briefly described two approaches [10]. One is from the role-
based aspect, while the other is cryptography-based. Instead of encrypting data, the former
generates different views of the same document for different roles. It is fine with the appli-
cations of data outsourcing over the Internet [10, 51], where storage is not a big concern,
but is unsuitable for the new RFID-based data storage applications [27,46]. As to the lat-
ter, as indicated by Crampton, the usage of cryptography in handling a complex XACP is
problematic [10]. Moreover, another important issue is that previous definitions of sim-
ple XACPs and complex XACPs are inaccurate, and thus fail to draw a clear line between
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Figure 3.6: Access Tree Generation (Simple XACP)
them. Therefore, we redefine these two terms as follows.
Definition 1 The ACP of an XML document D is called a Simple XACP, if the role set of
any node in the access tree of D is a subset ofthat of its parent node, if any. Otherwise, it
is called as a Complex XACP.
Given an access tree, Algorithm 3 is executed to determine the exact type of the associ-
ated XACP, simple or complex. Let NA be the set of all the nodes in the accès tree TA. We
continue with the example in Section 3.3.1 with a small change, namely, adding a new role
R5 which can access node A, C, D. Figure 3.7 shows the process of access tree generation
for this new XACP. In Figure 3.7, the role set of node D is not a subset of that of its parent
node, i.e., node B. Thus, this new XACP is complex. The policy checking algorithm is
given in Algorithm 3.
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Figure 3.7: Access Tree Generation (Complex XACP)
3.3.3 Access Tree Transformation
We observe that, in general tree structure encryption, to encrypt a node literally means to
encrypt only the content of that particular node. Contrarily, in XML encryption [79], to
encrypt a node n¿ means to encrypt both n¿ and all its child nodes, i.e., Tni.
Given that an XML document is protected by a complex XACP, there exists at least
one role that can access a specific node in the document, say A, but fails to access its
parent node. As a result, it is impossible to perform multi-layer encryption according to
the hierarchical structure of the access tree, or say the XML document, since to access the
content at an inner layer requires keys of both inner and outer layers. However, it does
not cause any problem if the XACP is simple. For this reason, the step of access tree
transformation is optional, and will be executed only when the XACP is complex.
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Algorithm 3 Policy Type Checking
Require: The access tree of a XML document TA.
Ensure: Return the type of XACP denoted as Type.
1: Type <— Simple
2: for all rii in NA do
3: if rii is not the root node of TA then
4: if ?{??) <£ M(Prnt(ni)) then





To address this issue, the original XML document has to be transformed in such a
way that a simple XACP is enforced on the transformed document, which is equivalent to
the complex XACP enforced on the original document. The transformation can be done
through either copying or moving certain parts of the document to other positions. In RFID-
based distributed storage applications, we are more concerned about storage efficiency.
Hence, our transformation algorithm, i.e., Algorithm 4, involves only moving operations.
More specifically, Algorithm 4 is executed from the root node of the access tree (denoted
as nA), i.e., ATT(TA, nA), to complete the task of transformation.
In terms of the complex XACP example described in Section 3.3.2, the resulting trans-
formed access tree is shown in Figure 3.8.
3.3.4 Role Key Generation
To reduce the key management overhead, it is desirable that each role maintains a min-
imum number of keys. Based on the scheme proposed by AkI and Taylor [1], Crampton
presented a method that applies hierarchical and RBAC to XML documents in terms of sim-
ple XACP that focuses on Internet data outsourcing applications [10]. In our framework,
through identifying complex policies and making appropriate transformations, Crampton's
scheme can be applied to the resulting access tree, no matter which type of ACP needs to
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Algorithm 4 Access Tree Transformation ATT(TA, nT)
Require: The access tree TA corresponding to T
Ensure: The transformed access tree TT
for all Hi in Chld(nT) do
2: CaW ATT(TA,m)
3: end for
4: if ?t is not the root node of TA then
5: if M(nT) <£ M(Prnt(nT)) then
6: Um <— ?t??(pt)
7: Done <— false
while nM is not the root node of TA and Done - false do
Uiv *— Prnt(nM)
if M(nr) Q M(nN) then
Prnt(nr) <— ^jv
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Figure 3.8: The Process of Access Tree Transformation
be enforced on the original XML document.
Take the resulting access tree in Figure 3.8 as an example. After further simplifica-
tion through combining leaf nodes that share the same parent node and have the same role
set, the resulting policy hierarchy and key hierarchy corresponding to TT are shown in
Figure 3.9. Each role B4 needs to maintain only one key, i.e., fc¿. Different parts of the doc-
ument that are accessible by users with Role Ri can be decrypted by either fc¿ or other keys
derived from /c¿. Note that, keys in the key hierarchy are arranged based on the partially
ordered set so that the key at a higher level, say n¿, can be used to derive any key at lower
levels, say rij, if there is a directed path from n¿ to n¿. For example, a user with Role R5 is
assigned with k5, from which the user can derive k(A), k(C), k(D).











(a) Policy Hierarchy (b) Key Hierarchy
Figure 3.9: Role Key Generation
distributed to users. This entails either making certain additional information public or pro-
viding each user with additional secret information (or both). In general, a key assignment
scheme (or scheme) for an information flow policy (L, <) defines four algorithms [H]:
• makeKeys returns a labeled set of encryption keys (?(?) : ? G L, denoted as k(L);
• makeSecrets returns a labeled set of secret values (s(?) : ? E L, denoted by a(L);
• makePublicData returns some set of data Pub that is made public by the trusted
centre;
• getKey takes x,y E L, s(?) and the public data, and returns n(y) whenever y < x.
To better understand the full process of role key generation we now describe AkI and
Tylor scheme, as illustrated by Crampton with an example. Let ? denote the key hierarchy.
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The data provider performs the following set of steps before generating the keys:
1 . Choose large primes ? and q and publish ? = pq
2. Choose ? € [2, ? - 1] such that (?, ?) — \
3. For each ? G ?, choose a distinct prime p(x)
4. For each ? G ?, define and publish p(?) = \\yp. P{y)
5. For each ? G ?, compute secret key k(x) = n^modn
In this scheme one secret and one public value are assigned with each key. The secret
value ? is known only to users and public value p is published by semi trusted server.
Figures 3.10 and 3.11 show how values of ? and p are associated with each element of
the hierarchy. Given key k(x), it is possible to derive key k(y), where k(y) < k(x), by
computing k(x)^x^n{y) = (?^?(?)??)) = «* (y) = k(y). Hence kA is defined to be ?,
felis «2.19.23.29.31.37.41 f ^JjJ800n-
The p (y) value is public information and n(y) is divisible by tt(?) whenever k(y) <
k(x) by construction. Note that it is not feasible to derive a key k(z), where k(z) > k(x),
because this would entail computing integral roots of nmodn. This method is also secure
against a set of users pooling information in an attempt to derive keys for which they are
not authorized [10].
3.3.5 Multi-Layer Encryption
Given a transformed XML tree TT and role keys, we now illustrate how to generate an
encrypted XML document in accordance with the given XACP such that a user has access











Figure 3.10: Assigning Prime Value to Each Node (Using AkI and Tylor Method [I])
W3C defines a standardized schema for representing encrypted data, cryptographic
keys and encryption algorithms in XML form, as part of recommendation on XML Encryp-
tion syntax and processing. EncryptedType is the abstract type from which EncryptedData
is derived. EncryptedData is a basic component, containing four sub-elements:
• EncryptionMethod: is an optional element that describes the encryption algorithm
applied to the cipher data. If the element is absent, the encryption algorithm must
be known by the recipient or the decryption will fail. In our experiments it is always
AES with 128-bit keys
• KeyInfo: is an optional element that carries information about the key used to encrypt
the data. Subsequent sections of this specification define new elements that may ap-











Figure 3.11: Assigning p Value to Each Node (Using AkI and Tylor Method [I])
therefore Keylnfo element is not explicitly defined in the encrypted document
• CipherData: is a mandatory element that contains the CipherValue or CipherRefer-
ence with the encrypted data
• EncryptionProperties: can contain additional information concerning the generation
of the EncryptedType (e.g., date/time stamp)
The actual XML multi-layer encryption is a recursive process of encrypting a same
node more than once, i.e., super encryption as explained in Section 2.2.1. One of the
biggest limitations of super encryption is that it increases the size of XML document expo-
nentially. In order to reduce the number of encryptions we merged those nodes with their
child nodes which are accessed by same set of roles, as described in Section 3.3.1. Notice
that after performing Algorithm 2 all the merged nodes are considered as single node. The
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encryption proceeds as follows: All nodes part of the same role set are encrypted with the
same key. A node is being encrypted every time its parent node gets encrypted. The num-
ber of encryption layers of a node apart from its own encryption is equal to the number of
its parent nodes.
For example, Figure 3.7 shows a tree generated from XML documents after performing
Algorithm 2. Node G is a leaf node and after encrypting with key say k(G), it will be
encrypted by keys k(C) and k(A) because of nodes C and A. In order to decrypt node G,
keys k(A), k(C), k(G) are required. Firstly k(A) is used, once decrypted, node A and
its attributes are revealed. G's contents however are still encrypted: both child of node A
are EncryptedData elements, while applying keys k(C) and k(G) respectively, contents of
node G gets revealed.
3.4 Decryption and Regenerating Tree Structure
After conducting experiments with the proposed framework, we came across an issue after
decryption, related to structure of XML document on the user side in complex XACP. In
order to enforce a complex policy we first convert it into a simple policy by reforming
the original structure of XML document. Because of these changes, it may be difficult for
users to draw parallels between information stored in different parts of the XML document.
For the example in Figure 3.7, in the original XML structure, node D is a child of node
B and in general child node contains information related to its immediate parent node.
But After access tree transformation to accommodate a complex policy, node D becomes
child of node A as shown in Figure 3.8, situations like this makes it difficult to understand
the hierarchy of information. In the following paragraphs we discuss XML decryption
standard recommended by W3C [79] and propose a solution for regenerating the original
XML structure after decryption.
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XML Decryption Specification [79]
For each EncryptedData element to be decrypted, the decryptor must:
1 . Process the element to determine the algorithm, parameters and KeyInfo element to
be used. If some information is omitted, the application must supply it.
2. Locate the data encryption key according to the Keylnfo element. If the data encryp-
tion key is encrypted, locate the corresponding key to decrypt it.
3. Decrypt the data contained in the CipherData element.
• If a CipherValue child element is present, then the associated text value is re-
trieved and base64 decoded so as to obtain the encrypted octet sequence.
• If a CipherReference child element is present, the URI and transforms (if any)
are used to retrieve the encrypted octet sequence
• The encrypted octet sequence is decrypted using the algorithm/parameters and
key value already determined from steps 1 and 2
Regenerating Original XML Structure
The XML decryption process itself is very straightforward. Consider the transformed ac-
cess tree in Figure 3.8, after decryption, role R5 is able to access nodes A, C and D. In
this case, everything works fine and according to the XACP as role R5 is authorized for
only those decrypted nodes. As R5 is not permitted to access node B, therefore its original
position in the XML document and its relation with node D is of no concern to this role.
Most of the XACP are a mixture of simple and complex, the roles which are governed by
simple polices require the exact pattern in which the original information was stored. Con-
sider the same example, after decrypting, role i?3 generates nodes A, B, C, D, I, J, G but it
is not possible to know the original position of node B for i?3.
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One of the simplest solutions would be to store two documents one for each simple and
complex policies, this works exactly like storing different views of the same document in
web-services. In our application, we have the constrain of the limited memory on RFID
tags. To get rid of this limitation, we propose to add a meta node with every node that
is displaced from its actual position. The meta node contains information that identifies
actual position and helps in regeneration of original XML structure.
Now we describe this process with an example, before storing information in the meta
node, we perform the following steps:
• Starting from the root node, assign a level to every node such that root node is at level
one and for all the other nodes set the level one greater than the level of its parent
node.
• Starting from the root node, for all nodes with same parent at same level, assign a
number such that leftmost node is zero and each subsequent node on the right has a
number one greater than the number of its left side node. Then start with each child
node as root and assign number to its child. We call these numbers position numbers.
Figure 3.12 shows levels and position numbers assigned to Figure 3.7, before transfor-
mation. Going back to the same example, with levels and position numbers assigned, the
following information is required to put node D in its original state:
• Level and position number of node B (the parent node of node D)
• Position number of node D
The level of parent node helps in adding a direct branch between a displaced node and
its original parent node. The level of parent node of node D is 2, which identifies the level
of node D is 3 in original structure. In general there is more than one node at certain level;
position number of parent node is required to find out the exact position of the parent out
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PN = O, L = 1
PN = I1L = ZPN = 0, L = 2
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Figure 3.12: Level and Position Number Assignment
of many nodes at the same level. In the given example, there are two nodes at level 2
and position number of node B is zero. This implies that node B is the left most child of
node A. The position number of a displaced node helps in locating its exact position in the
original structure. The position number of node D is zero, i.e., it is the left most child of
node B. With these three parameters the original XML structure can be regenerated.
This extra information can be stored as shown in Figure 3.13. A meta node does not
need to be encrypted explicitly; it can be encrypted with the same key as its related dis-













Figure 3.13: Transformed Access Tree with Meta-Node
3.5 Empirical Results
To evaluate the usability of the proposed access control framework and multi-level encryp-
tion scheme, we perform the following experiments, which are implemented in Java, to
measure the storage efficiency of the proposed scheme.
The RFID tags used in our experiments are based on Intelligent Long Range (ILR) tech-
nology provided by IDENTEC SOLUTIONS. We use i-Q RFID tag which have range up
to 100 m and have 32 KB memory. These tags are mounted on the walls of corridors and/or
rooms in order to span the required space. We use an i-Cardlll RFID reader, which can
be embedded into a Computer or PDA processing unit via a PCMCIA (Personal Computer
Memory Card International Association) slot.
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Table 3.3: Encryption Modes
XML Tag Tag Content Outermost-level
Encryption Tag
Inner-level Encryption Tag(s)
(if has more than one level encryption)
Ciphertext
Encoding Conversion
Mode I XML-Enc XML-Enc XML-Enc XML-Enc Yes
Mode II Std-Enc Std-Enc Std-Enc Std-Enc No
Mode III Std-Enc Std-Enc Std-Enc No Encryption No
As shown in Table 3.3, three types of encryption modes are implemented in our exper-
iments. In Table 3.3, XML-Enc and Std-Enc denote XML Encryption [79] and standard
encryption, respectively. For XML encryption, we use a Java implementation of Apache
XML Project [21] that follows the W3C recommendation [79] and uses AES with 128-bit
keys.
In our preliminary experiments, we encrypt an XML document with the structure shown
in Figure 3.5 in two distinct ways so as to conform to the simple XACP shown in Table 3.2
and the complex XACP described in Section 3.3.2, respectively. In either case, we assign
an equal amount of data to each node in the document, and then increase this amount
gradually until the RFID tag memeory is full, i.e., 32 KB. Moreover, we assume that all the
encryptions performed on this document use the same cryptographic algorithm (e.g., AES)
and are with the same parameters (e.g., 128-bit key size).
In Figure 3.14 and Figure 3.15, we show the percentage of increase from the original
XML document to the encrypted one under three encryption modes, given that the access
control enforced by the encryption conforms to the required simple or complex XACPs,
respectively. In both figures, the increase of the document size after encryption in Mode I
is much higher than those of Mode II or Mode III. To better understand the results, in the
next paragraphs each mode is illustrated separately along with its outcome.
Model
This mode is exactly the same as being defined and specified by W3C for XML encryp-
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Figure 3.14: Storage Efficiency Under Simple XACP
document is performed as follows. Firstly the section of the document (the Element or
Element content) to be encrypted are serialized (into UTF-8). This can be done using
the canonicalization algorithms available for XML Signature. The resulting byte stream
is then encrypted using the selected algorithm. The encrypted bytes are then base64 en-
coded and placed in a < CipherValue > structure in an < EncryptedData > ele-
ment. If asymmetric encryption is used, a key is generated; this is in turn encrypted
into an < EncryptedKey > element which is added as a < Keylnfo > of the <
EncryptedData >. The resulting < EncryptedData > replaces the nodes in the XML
document that were encrypted [47].
The conversion from UFT-8 to base64 results in a rise up-to 33% of the original size
in case of simple XML encryption. The problem further rises during multi-level encryp-































170 256 344 428
size per node (bytes)
Figure 3.15: Storage Efficiency Under Complex XACP
encryption. In the process of super-encryption, the extra encryption tags added to represent
the information required for decryption and to meet the specifications also get converted
to base64 in each round of encryption, which results in extra overhead. For example, Fig-
ure 2.9 shows the encrypted value stored in < CipherValue > after encrypting XML
document shown in Figure 2.6, twice. After, first round of encryption there is an increase
of 33%, this compounds the overall increase after second round.
Because of the above mentioned reasons, in Figures 3.14 and 3.15, the increases of the
document size in Mode I are from 121% to 188% under the simple XACP and from 175%
to 306% under the complex XACP, respectively.
59
Mode II
To overcome the limitation of encryption overhead in Mode I, we introduce a new method
for encrypting. This new method makes use of all the predefined XML encryption stan-
dards, for example; elements like < EncryptedData > to define type and < Encrypted -
Method > to represent the encryption algorithm used. The only difference between the
two modes is conversion of encrypted text, i.e. Mode II does not conduct any conversion
to base64 from UFT-8 after encryption.
The encryption is done by using a standard encryption procedure, the size of ciphered
text in < CipherData > would be slightly more than the original plain text. The extra
encryption tags are treated the same way. The encrypted XML file looks exactly the same
as shown in Figure 2.9, but there is a big difference in the size of both files. Figure 3.14 and
Figure 3.15 show that the percentages of increase in Mode II are from 16% to 65% under
the simple XACP and from 38% to 138% under the complex XACP, respectively.
Mode III
As mentioned earlier, storage space is one of the biggest concerns in our application.
Though Mode II is able to reduce the encryption size to a very large percentage still we
can further improve the storage efficiency. We noticed that, in both previous modes the
extra encryption tags repeat the same information in every super-encryption cycle because
we used symmetric encryption with same algorithm and key size in all the experiments. To
get rid of this repeated information, we made some changes in Mode II.
In case of simple encryption, Mode II and Mode III work in the same fashion. Both
use standard encryption procedure without conversion to base64 and add extra encryption
tags around ciphertext. But during multi-layer encryption, instead of adding encryption
tags with same information in every super-encryption round, we add only once after the
last encryption round. The XML file looks exactly the same as it does in Mode I and II, but
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the size is further smaller than in Mode II.
As a result, only the outermost-level encryption tag is retained. Figure 3.14 and Fig-
ure 3.15 show that the percentages of increase in Mode III are from 2.8% to 20% under the
simple XACP and from 4.2% to 18% under the complex XACP, respectively. According to
our experiments, Mode III is the best option for encrypting the XML document.
3.6 Challenges
Although the proposed framework can be implemented using existing RFID technology,
there are many hindrances that need to be addressed to make it fully functional and more
robust. Further development in the following areas would lead to less expensive hardware
solutions, industry-wide standards and low-cost supporting software applications. The
challenges can be categorized under the following main topics: (1) challenges related to
adopting RFID technology; (2) XML challenges; and (3) technology adoption and social
challenges.
(1) Challenges related to adopting RFID technology
The Following are some of the obstacles that need to be overcome in order to adapt RFID
technology:
• RF challenges: Attaching an RFID to certain material reduces it signal strength. It is
directly related to the effects of materials such as liquids or metal on electromagnetic
waves that interfere with the operation of the RFID system and shorten the readability
range.
• Interference: Reading one tag at a time makes it accurate but very slow. Radio
signals transmitted simultaneously by different tags cause interference and collision,
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lowering the quality of transmission and increasing the error rate. This requires anti-
collision procedure, which considerably slow the system. Further, simultaneously
reading large number of tags makes it difficult to find if any tag failed to get read.
• Standards: The lack of completer global standard adds to companies resistance to
wide adoption of RFID technology. There is no consistent UHF spectrum allocation
and power regulations and certifications also vary in different countries. In addition,
vendors are concerned with the high patent royalty which becomes an obstacle to the
development of RFID systems.
• Cost: Currently the cost of manufacturing and customization of tags is high. In
addition, RFID systems require infrastructure to interconnect all the stakeholders
to be able to communicate electronically. This infrastructure requires tremendous
amount of design and implementation efforts. On the other hand, the intangible
benefits of implementing RFID systems make the cost-benefit and ROI (Return on
Investment) analysis more complicated.
Furthermore, barcode systems have been already implemented by many enterprises.
RFID is still at developing stage; therefore, enterprises will keep two systems to
operate. If RFID reform happens, then for a period of time RFID and barcodes must
work side by side.
• Physical Protection: Since the tags are attached to components throughout the life-
cycle, proper physical protection (e.g., against temperature and material effects) is
needed. Further, protection from adversaries is also required; attacker can physically
destroy the tag and launch denial of service attack.
• Memory: Tag memory is another big limiting issue. Although, RFID active tags
have the liberty over other technologies like Barcode, to store information but it is
not enough to store large amount of data.
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• Data transfer speed: The RFID system must support high data transfer speed in order
to be able to access all the information in short period of time. The low data commu-
nication rate would decrease the expected efficiency of the proposed framework.
• Interoperability: The wide implementation of RFID systems requires more standards
to cover all types of tags and frequencies. Moreover, the need for multi-protocol tags
and readers is evident for interoperability of different systems.
• Power: Limited lifetime of battery-assisted tags is a challenge that should to be ad-
dressed. Hence the choice between active and passive tags depends on the application
requirements.
(2) XML challenges
• XML Encryption: XML encryption specification has been standardized by W3C, but
no standard set of APIs for XML encryption is available yet. Several projects provide
XML encryption APIs, none of them is final yet. Further, in XML encryption, clear
text uses 8-bits per character (UTF-8), while the ciphertext is represented using 6-bits
per character (base64). When the ciphertext encoding is converted from base64 to
ASCII, there is a 33% increase of size. Even worse, such an increase is compounded
in multi-level encryption, which results in a large percentage of increase just after a
few levels of encryption.
• XML representation ofBIM: XML has emerged as a standard format of information
exchange. The efforts for developing BIM standards in XML format are in their early
stage and the available standards and implementation of BIM-based systems are not
complete and thorough.
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Adopting BIM standards has its own challenges and obstacles; issues such as indus-
try acceptance, interoperability between existing software platforms, change man-
agement from conventional methods to new BIM, qualified human resources, legal
considerations and initial cost to change (hardware, software, training and implemen-
tation) have to be tackled for industry-wide implementation of BIM.
(3) Technology Adoption and Social Challenges
• Wide Implementation of such systems would bring resistance from companies that
are using traditional methods because of needed extra efforts and training. Hence,
it is important to provide strong incentives for enterprises for adoption of new tech-
nologies.
3.7 Conclusions
The proposed framework provides an implementation approach for protecting data stored
on RFID tags, which are based on RBAC and multilevel encryption. The approach covered
the conceptual system design and elaborated the interaction between the system compo-
nents. In addition, a more accurate definition of simple/complex XACP is given, together
with an algorithm for determining the type of a specific XACP. Moreover, we presented the
first workable cryptographic-based method that can handle complex XACP cases without
helps from an online trusted server. It is done through transforming the original document
and converting the complex XACP problem to a simple XACP problem.
To clarify the introduced concepts, a conceptual data structure with a sample XML file
were used as an example. The proposed conceptual data structure provided a structured
approach for managing the memory of RFID tags. To better understand the framework,
all the processes involved in encryption and decryption are explained explicitly with an
example. To reduce the file size after XML encryption, two new encryption modes were
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discusseci and difference in size were shown in experimental results.
Furthermore, the potential challenges to the scope and implementation of the frame-





In this chapter, we present the case study implemented at Concordia University facilities to
test our proposed framework with ongoing RFID based FM and emergency management
research projects. The FM project facilitates the process of progress monitoring and sta-
tus tracking of facilities components during their lifecycle. RFID tags are used to store
maintenance, inspection and environment information of a component and its surrounding
area where it is deployed. The information stored on RFID tags serves various purposes
for different operations. In this case study the main focus is on safety equipments that play
a crucial part in case of emergencies like fire, but we also take into consideration the in-
formation about various conditions at different parts of building, such as hazard materials
being used in certain labs, people using lab and current temperature. Though the current
projects increase the efficiency of the system but they suffer greatly from security issues,
especially, access control.
Different parts of data stored on RFID tags must be accessible to authorized users as
per their permissions. For example, an inspector has permission to update some parts of
data and information such as hazard-material should be available to fire fighters and safety
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personals only. However, current approaches do not cope with this limitation and once a
user login to the system, he can access all the information stored, weather he has permission
or not.
To remove security problems, we introduce our security framework with RBAC. The
required software module are designed and implemented.
4.2 Case Study: Facilities Management & Emergency Re-
sponse
4.2.1 Background of the Case Study
Concordia Environmental Health and Safety Office (EH&S) is in charge of operation and
maintenance of a big and highly dispersed environment. It covers an operational area of
75 buildings with more than 3500 fire extinguishers and 220 fire valves which need to
be inspected on a regular basis. The huge amount of effort and investment need to be
considered in order to operate and maintain such an environment. The conventional process
of inspection, test and maintenance of the safety equipments is operational but it is not
efficient, does not cover security aspects and can be improved using process improvement
techniques and also by introducing new emerging technologies [53].
For the purpose of fire safety equipments management at Concordia University, Con-
cordia EH&S office provides set of requirements that are: (1) Easy identification of equip-
ments, (2) Structured documentation, (3) Decentralized data storage, (4) Fraud prevention,
(5) Paperless information management, (6) Reduce human resource and increase activities
efficiency, (7) Standard compliance, and (8) Costs Reduction. Based on the assessment
of the requirements and considering available resources and technologies, we have iden-
tified that introduction of our RFID security framework in the existing system can fulfill
67
most of the above-mentioned requirements and provides us with a real-world case study to
implement our proposed framework.
In this case study, three roles are used: inspector, fire fighter and general user. All
the three roles have different permissions and work at different security levels. Although
our main objective is to provide access control in the proposed RFID based approach,
we also investigate the scope of adding additional information like floor plan on RFID
tags. RFID tags are used for storing information about fire safety equipments and building
environment and various components within that environment. Amongst these equipments,
fire extinguishers are chosen because of their importance and the higher frequency of their
maintenance activities, but this can be easily expanded to other types of equipments as per
there importance and usage for different applications. In this case study, all the required
software modules have been developed and the applicability of the RFID based system has
been tested by several field experiments.
In case of emergencies, to find fire extinguishers, the fire fighters take the arrival in-
struction for that alerting line and immediately start for the building in which the alarm has
been activated. The arrival instruction contains only little information about the building.
Usually only the building number, the number of the fire detection line, and the way to
the fire brigade terminal are drawn on a small map [66]. Once the respective building is
reached a central fire alarm station displays the fire detection line and exact fire detector
that has caused the alarm. Building maps at these terminals are available in paper format.
Insufficient information about orientation and reconstruction work within a building
often make it very difficult to find the exact fire extinguisher. Huge amount of effort is
required to keep these building maps up-to-date and distribute them to different central fire
stations. The orientation within a building, information about the direct way to the fire
extinguisher, the exact position of the fire detector, the areas where employees and students
are located are very crucial to save human lives [66].
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Fire extinguishers should be regularly inspected, maintained, recharged and tested based
on National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) [56] regulations and guidelines. Strict
safety regulations of sensitive systems in buildings, such as fire related subsystems, force
the owners to spend huge amount of money to perform inspection on a regular basis. Also,
only approved fire inspector should do inspection and the information must be kept confi-
dential from unauthorized personals.
The results of inspection and maintenance should be stored securely and made available
to owners and fire fighters only. All the records regarding confidential building information
like use of hazard material in certain labs are kept in a sealed envelope and in case of fire
emergencies, this information is given to fire fighters at the spot, this further adds extra
time to already cumbersome process.
Case Study Target Components
We considered components which could prove helpful in case of fire. Portable fire ex-
tinguishers are intended as a first line of defense to cope with fires of limited size. The
extinguishers are available in all Concordia buildings and their inspection and maintenance
are of high importance.
PvFID tags could also be deployed in laboratories which contain hazard material. These
tags contain information about the material used and the people working in the specific
facility. Currently the information about hazard-materials is available in paper format floor
plan, available only at time of emergency, causing delay in rescue process. Also, this floor
plan does not provide any information about number of people works in the given vicinity.
4.2.2 Existing Procedures
The service technicians receive their daily work assignment on paper. The work assign-
ments consist of a list of fire extinguishers to be inspected and the respective maintenance
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orders. First, they have to find and access each extinguisher, which might be difficult to
get at. In order to facilitate locating the fire equipments, inspectors are provided with
paper-based floor plans with fire equipment signs. Figure 4.1 show floor plan with fire
extinguisher signs. Similarly, fire fighters are given paper based floor plan with extra infor-
mation, because of safety regulations we cannot show that floor plan. Finding equipments
are time consuming process since the paper maps are not easy to read and not regularly
updated. A floor plan with extra information contains confidential information and must be












Figure 4. 1 : Floor Plan with Fire Equipments Signs
Before using tablet PC for manual inspection data entry, the technicians handwrote
lengthy maintenance reports after inspection as proof that they had actually done the in-
spection. Later, they handed in completed maintenance reports to the office clerks, who
in turn entered the report into the back-end system and forwarded it for archiving. In the
case of defects, an overhaul had to be planned. This paper-based process proved to be error
prone, and manual data entry is time-consuming. With the paper-based archive, obtaining
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detailed information on actual maintenance history was a tedious process.
Because maintenance reports were often poorly structured or information was missing,
many additional inquiries arose. This further adds to the cost of whole process. Concordia
hires contractors to perform most inspections and pays them on the basis of the number of
extinguishers they inspect. In the past, Concordia EH&S office had to control the work that
has been done by the contractor to verify the quality of the service. A newer system has
been adopted by the external contractor. In the new system the handheld devices are used
to scan bar-codes that are attached to both safety equipments and also the location of the
items (fire extinguishers cage or fixtures) [53].
4.2.3 Proposed System
In our prototype system, RFID tags are attached to various building components. Infor-
mation required for various tasks is stored on the tags. By storing information on the tags
itself, used in various processes such as inspection and maintenance would integrate several
operations. This helps in achieving decentralized data storage and eliminating the role of
central database. RFID tags acts as mini databases and become a potential target of attack.
An extra layer of protection is required on the information stored in tags.
Information stored in RFID tags has different security levels, some sections of informa-
tion do not require any protection, i.e., should be available to everyone; but some parts are
very sensitive and must be revealed to specific roles. For example, inspector and mainte-
nance/ repair personnel have access to the information about the history and the condition
of the extinguishers, and information about location and floor plans is assessable to all
users, without having access to any central database. Thus, it provides data redundancy
and eliminates the rework due to not-up-to-date data.
Encryption is used to protect data from the adversaries and unauthorized users. One key
is provided to each role to decrypt part of the document, corresponding to its permissions.
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Key is transmitted through secure channel. The process of encryption was explained with
technical details in Section 3.3. In this case study, we conducted tests with three different
roles; inspector, fire fighter and general user. The whole document is encrypted and each
role has a separate key to access its share of information, this provides fraud prevention and
increases the reliability.
Easy identification of components is also achieved by developed Graphical User Inter-
face (GUI) that shows scanned information from RFID tags attached to various components
on the floor plan. The information about part of floor plan is also stored on RFID tags, this
helps in generating the floor plan dynamically. This dynamic floor plan generation elim-
inates many limitations of paper based floor plan. Our prototype takes into consideration
most of the requirements specified by Concordia EH&S office. One of the requirements of
cost reduction is arguable but with RFID technology getting cheaper every year, this will
be achieved in coming years as well. The primary tests were performed on active tags with
32 KB of memory. Moreover, the selected tags are designed to work well near liquids and
metals.
Conceptual System Design
Facility Management & Emergency Response System is initially composed of following
components:
1. RFID Tags: Active tags attached to fire extinguishers that contains information about
the extinguisher.
2. RFID Reader. PCMCIA portable reader module compatible with proprietary active
tags that is being held by Concordia EH&S personnel.
3. Handheld Device: PDAs equipped with PCMCIA slot that host the RFID reader and
the software.
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4. Software: the developed software for communicating with RFID tags and readers.
The conceptual diagram in Figure 4.2 illustrates the design of the RFID based system.
It shows the interaction between the hardware and software components as well as the inter-
action of the end-user with the system by the means of the GUI. Furthermore, the diagram
lists the functionalities available to the end-user which include: reading from the tag, per-
forming the inspection, updating the tag, writing to the tag, etc. The software controls the
reader to start scanning and display the received tags. To perform an inspection, the user
has to select the inspector role and provide his role key. After role and key verification,


























Figure 4.2: Design of RFID Based Facilities Management and Emergency Response Sys-
tem
RFID Tag Data Structure
The designed system is intended to work for different types of components and different tag
types. In other words the design aims to be expandable and support multi-tag environment.
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In the case study different tags with various memory sizes were used. We conducted exper-
iments with active tags with 8 KB and 32 KB memory. Active tags with 32 KB memory
also has embedded sensors, that is used to measure the temperature. Different amount of
data is being stored in RFID tags, depending on their memory and location of deployment.
Based on our design, extra information about the component and its surrounding other
than its unique ID is needed to be written on the tag. The required data fields should be
carefully selected based on the requirements, in case of low memory active tags the data
should be "abbreviated" to smaller set and stored on the tags. Active tag with large memory
contains location/floor plan data and information needed for inspection and emergency
scenarios.
Selection of crucial data to be stored on the extinguisher tags are based on the NFPA
guidelines and result of the meetings with field inspectors and EH&S staff [53]. The most
important criteria for selecting the data field are the applicability of data. The main purpose
of adding data as well as the ID on the tags is to provide the capability to perform informa-
tion gathering/maintenance/repair activities without having access to data in database.
The memory of the tags has been segmented and contains to the following informa-
tion [53]: (1) ID, (2) Specification (e.g., manufacturing date), (3) Status, (4) Maintenance
data (e.g., condition and defective part), (5) History (e.g., last inspection date) and, (6)
Environment data (e.g., location).
For the use in the BIM-based indoor-emergency-navigation-system, a data format is
needed which contains the information in a unique structure to use only one tool for dis-
playing the plans on mobile devices or generating routing maps. Defined by Industry Foun-
dation Classes (IFC), the IFC-XML is an exchange format for building models. It has been
specified by the IAI (International Alliance for Interoperability). It became an international
standard and defines an exchange format and contains object classes for storey, roofs, walls,
stairs, etc. [66].
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In earlier experiments, we stored parts of the floor plan in image format such as JPG,
on different RPID tags. This is very crude and static way of representation; neither has
it helped in locating components nor in navigation. To enhance the system functionality,
image format is replaced with CAD file format. Though CAD file represent floor plan in
detail but the size of CAD files is very large, even the part of full floor plan is too big to fit.
In current experiments we stored the CAD file on the handheld device, but we are already
working to dynamically draw the floor plan from the information stored on RFID tag using
IFC-XML, instead of image or CAD files.
In active tags all the information is stored in XML format. A new XML file is created
based on the NFPA guidelines, part of this file is described in Figure 4.3.
Prototype Software Flowchart
The proposed flowchart extends [53] work in facilities management project, by adding
different roles and security levels. The user logs in to the system in order to proceed
with the software. The login procedure involves entering the username (code) and the
password. The EH&S users would be assigned an RFID badge that has their user code. The
inspector or fire fighter can login to system by scanning his/her RFID badge and entering
the password. The system can support fingerprint authentication in conjunction with ID
scan in future improvement. The username and password are different from role and its
corresponding key. This extra layer of security is added to differentiate between different
users within a same role. This would guaranty that only authorized user is logging to the
system and accessing only permitted portion of the document. This could be used as a
fraud prevention feature.
After authentication, the user would have access to certain operations which are com-
mon for all roles. These operations include; view tag information and check current tem-
perature of the surrounding environment of scanned tag. Figure 4.5 shows a snapshot of
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graph showing temperature retrieved from the RFID tag. This temperature information is
stored in a log file on the tag itself, and is not a part of the XML file. The data structure
of temperature log file is vendor dependent. After selecting a valid tag index, the software
loads general operations and any user can retrieve very limited information about specific
tag. To access more information user has to select its role and provide a valid key. Once key
is validated, prototype loads role specific operations. Figure 4.4 shows software flowchart.
The major operations developed for prototype system are: (1) new maintenance task
and (2) view data. New maintenance task is designed for FM inspector and view data
for fire fighter. After selecting a role and providing valid key, EH&S worker can load
the assigned job. Job is the list of inspection/maintenance activities that is planned for the
inspector by supervisor. The inspector can manually add extinguisher IDs that are not in the
list but are needed to be added to the task list. Software would provide visualization of the
extinguishers in the job list on the floor plans to aid the inspector locate the extinguishers
on the floor.
The software also provides navigation aid for the inspector to locate the extinguishers
in the building using active tags. The software has pre-loaded floor plans as a visualization
layer. In these experiments we used CAD file to display floor plan pre-loaded in the hand-
held devices. The floor plan created from the information based on IFC standard, stored in
RFID tag is not very clear and does not contain all the details yet. To create a full floor plan
with all the details using IFC standard is a part of future work. By surveying the area to de-
tect the tags, the sensed tags are shown on the floor plan based on their location information.
Using the long range tags allows inspectors to visually find the surrounding components
on the floor plan and decreases the time needed to locate them. Figure 4.6 shows a sample
snapshot of the screen, where the locations of sensed components are shown with green
stars and the selected RFID tag is shown red square shape on the floor plan and it helps
the user to visually identify the components on the plan. Figure 4.6 also shows scanned
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tags and two types of information. The first type is general information, it is not stored in
XML file and can be accessed by any role (shown in green rectangle), the second type is
confidential information (shown in red rectangle), stored in XML file and can only be seen
after decrypting with either inspector or fire fighter role key.
After finding the extinguisher, the inspector starts the task by scanning the extinguisher
tag. It might be possible that more than one tag is being read while scanning, in this case,
the system shows the information of the sensed tag and the user is required to choose the
appropriate tag to proceed using an indexing system. Once the tag is selected, software
shows its location on the map by collection information from the tag. Before the other
information related to inspection is shown, user has to select role and provide valid key.
The data that is recorded on the tag is shown and it helps the inspector to quickly review
the history of inspection and also the previous maintenance result and information about
the type and possible defects of the extinguisher.
Before performing the actual inspection, the software automatically generates alerts for
the inspector based on the data that is available on the extinguisher tag. The alerts are de-
signed to warn the inspector about the required maintenance/repair/replacement procedure
based on the regulation.
The software contains the checklist of inspection and maintenance activities based on
the type of extinguishers. It can include the standard procedures as a reference for less
experienced EH&S workers. The inspector performs the tasks and complete easy-to-fill
forms (in the format of checkboxes or drop down menus). This data entry step is compar-
atively faster and more accurate than paper based system. Furthermore, the data will be
saved in a structured fashion and and well protected form the adversaries.
The inspector views the result of inspection/maintenance activity and confirms. Before
the software updates the data on the tag, it encrypts the modified data with inspector role
key. The task is considered to be completed only after the successful data update of RFID
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tag. Flowcharts of view data and new management task are shown in Appendix A.
Hardware Test
Several hardware-related tests have been conducted in order to identify appropriate RFID
tags and readers for the case studies. The test has been designed to identify suitable set
of tags and readers and antennas with required readability range, ruggedness, and noise
protection for each scenario and component.
4.3 Summary
This case study has been done in the EV building of Concordia University where active tags
were attached to 9th floor fire extinguishers. The technological feasibility of the system has
been tested in a real working environment.
The case study showed the applicability of the proposed approach. This covered dif-
ferent types of components and facilitated different processes. As efforts to develop full
secure RFID communication model for facilities management and emergency response is
still evolving, the full implementation of the case study should be considered as the first
step. It is concluded that further study of XML data format for representing safety equip-
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Conclusions and Future Work
5.1 Research Summary
In this research, we highlighted that there is an increasing interest in using RFID tags as
distributed storage and proposed the first work that investigates security issues, in particular
access control, in this new type of applications. A framework to protect data on the RFID
tags through RBAC is proposed. Users are assigned different roles as per there permissions;
this also helps in managing large number of users. Multilevel encryption secures different
parts of same document from adversaries, and users of the system having different permis-
sions. In this research, simple and complex XACPs are discussed thoroughly and more
profound and accurate definition is given along with an algorithm to draw a differentiating
line between them. The proposed access control model is very flexible and can accom-
modate both simple and complex ACPs. We introduced the first cryptographic solution to
protect the data stored on the RFID tags without doing any cryptographic computations on
the tag itself.
The choice of XML format was made because of its acceptance as a standard to store
and exchange information in vast number of applications. Moreover, XML encryption
specifications are well defined and standardized. Although the proposed framework and
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algorithms are defined using XML format, it can be readily extended to support other types
of data representations with hierarchical structure.
The given framework enhances the scope of existing RFID base FMS by providing
security with RBAC and multi-level encryption. Our research provides a secure communi-
cation framework to support a futuristic vision of RFID based distributed storage environ-
ment. Although the case study showed the technical feasibility of our proposed framework
using available hardware, several challenges identified in this research should be addressed
to make the vision feasible.
5.2 Research Contributions and Conclusions
The introduced security framework ensures confidentiality and integrity of the data stored
on the RFID tags in distributed storage applications. This would address the need of secu-
rity by utilizing multi-level encryption together with RBAC, which has been identified as a
major challenge in previous related research. The proposed algorithms cover both simple
and complex XACPs and successfully transform a complex policy into a simple one to ac-
commodate broad range of ACPs, which are very common in real-world applications and
have never been addressed thoroughly before.
Our research is similar to secure data publishing of XML document and does not de-
pend on the computational capabilities of RFID tags. The proposed framework can work
efficiently with the limited computational capabilities of RFID tags to perform read and
write operations. The case study showed the applicability of our proposed approach and
validated the usability of the various methods identified in this research.
The research contributions can be summarized as follows: (1) Provide a secure frame-
work that ensures data confidentiality and integrity, with multi-level encryption and RBAC
of the data stored on an RFID tag; (2) A more systematic definition of simple and complex
XACPs is given, that it helps in selecting storage-efficient encryption method; (3) Explore
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various modes to encrypt XML documents, apart from standard specification, in order to
save storage space; (4) Introduce a workable cryptographic solution to handle complex
XACPs; and (5) Demonstrate a case study to verify the applicability of the proposed ap-
proach.
5.3 Future Work
The following steps are necessary for fully realizing the proposed approach: (1) To develop
a protocol that manages the updates in XACPs; (2) To design an algorithm that generates
role keys in accordance with the changes in XACPs and XML document structure; (3)
To introduce techniques that can be used to implement specific type of access, such as
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Appendix - Software Flowcharts
Figure A.l and A.2 show the flowchart for view data and new maintenance task, respec-
tively. The major processes in software flow (identified by number in flowcharts) are as
follow:
1 . The user selects a role and enter corresponding key.
2. Software downloads encrypted XML file from the selected tag.
3. Decrypt file using key provided by the user. The partially decrypted portions of XML
file are compared with the ACP embedded in the software, if the decrypted content
matches with the permitted portions of file, then role specific operations are loaded.
4. After authentication and authorization he selects the type of operation. One of the
three major operations could be chosen.
• View data: for retrieval of stored information on the tags such as the history of
the objects
• New Maintenance: to start new inspection/maintenance activity
• Show Path: to show a path form one position to another by calculation routing
information
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5. There are two methods for retrieving information.
• Scanning tag
• Entering the ID or the description of the item/location
6. The scanned tag or entered ID, Base on the type of the tag, stored information on the
tag is shown.
7. The fire fighter/inspector has the option to view the history of the item/location from
the database.
8. For the new maintenance activity there are three options available for the inspector:
9. Load job: the task list (the list of fire extinguishers that are planned to be inspected
by inspector through operation management system) can be loaded. After choosing
this option the list is loaded from the database and the inspector would do the job
as planned. After loading the lists the related maps with the target extinguishers are
shown in the software.
10. Scan area: the inspector have the option to scan the area to detect the location tags.
The tags that are sensed by the RFID reader in that area are shown in the related map.
11. Enter location info: the inspector chooses this option if he knows which building
or floor he wants to inspect. By selecting the desired location from the drop down
menus, he selects the location and the related map with the sign of extinguishers is
shown in the software.
After deciding on the inspection target (the extinguisher that is going to be inspected)
the inspector would find the item using the map.
12. Inspector starts the inspection/maintenance activity.
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13. The location information on the tag is shown. The inspector has the option to edit
the data on the location tag, if required.
14. The component specific information is shown.
15. Based on the previous information recorded on the tag, related alerts are shown.
The sample alerts are: Hydrostatic test needed, Recharging needed, The extinguisher
is obsolete and, Extinguisher type is invalid. The alerts are automatically generated
by software based on the information on the items and also the time and date on the
PC. It would eliminate the chance for human error.
16. A user friendly checklist to log the inspection/maintenance results is shown. The
status of the extinguisher and also the name of the defected part can be entered in the
system using user friendly interface. The inspector can also get the instruction for
inspecting different types of extinguishers if needed.
17. After completing the actual inspection and entering the information about the possi-
ble defective part or condition of the extinguisher. The software shows the data to be
written in the tag and request for confirmation.
18. If the information is correct the data is encrypted with inspector role key and written
on the RFID tag.
19. The inspector can go to the next extinguisher to inspect or terminate the process.
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Figure A.l : View Data Flowchart
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Figure A.2: New Inspection/Maintenance Flowchart
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